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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

"PERESTROIKA" IN THE SOVIET UNION

FEBRUARY 18, 1988

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PUBLIC HEARING ON "PERESTROIKA" IN THE SOVIET UNION

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1988

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 538 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, at 10 a.m., Representative Steny H. Hoyer (Chairman) presiding.

In attendance from the Commission: Representative Edward Feighan, Senators Alfonse D'Amato and Harry Reid.

Also in attendance: Mary Sue Hafner, deputy staff director and general counsel; Jane Fisher, senior staff consultant; and Mike Amitay, coordinator.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HOYER

Chairman HOYER. Good morning, I'm going to open the hearing this morning on *perestroika*. I'd like to extend a welcome to Senator D'Amato, ranking Republican member, from the Senate.

I don't know if Senator DeConcini is going to be able to be here. He's chairing another meeting.

This morning's hearing is to try to give us a better insight and understanding of what *perestroika* is. We are pleased to have two distinguished panelists. Mr. Reddaway will discuss changes in the human rights situation, among other things. And Mr. Kozlovsky will tell us a little bit about how Soviet citizens are affected by the reforms that have been instituted.

Before we begin, however, I'd like to take a moment to remember a dear friend of mine and of this Commission. She passed away last weekend. That is Dorothy Goldberg, wife of Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg. She had been involved in the CSCE process since its inception and maintained a keen and committed interest in the CSCE process. She will be long remembered by members of the Commission and its staff.

I might say, of course, as well, that Mrs. Goldberg's husband Justice Goldberg, was one of those who made the Helsinki process. He took it a very long step forward in making sure that they did, in fact, focus on individual cases, as well as overall principles. He shall be long remembered by many throughout the Helsinki signatory states.

A few years ago the General Secretary told a party plenum that,

Housing, hospitals, and child care centers fail to go into operation on time. Uncompleted projects are something accepted as finished and regulations on environmental controls are violated.

That same General Secretary drew attention to,

Cold apartments, unsanitary conditions and transportation, poor street lighting or hooliganism in public places.

Now, as you may have guessed, that was not Mikhail Gorbachev speaking, but rather Konstantin Chernenko, Gorbachev's immediate predecessor. He recognized the enormous difficulties the Soviet Union was experiencing in the area of industrial development, agriculture, public health, labor relations, to name just a few.

It was clear, even to dispassionate observers that if the Soviet Union wished to compete with the West in both the technological sense and the ideological sense, certain changes would have to be made. Gorbachev intends to implement those changes.

Mr. Gorbachev is now completing his third year in power. And every day the press talks of changes, or at least the promise of changes under the rubric of *glasnost* or *perestroika* or both. Approximately 1 year ago the Commission heard testimony on the Soviet policy of *glasnost*. That is the public campaign to promote the policies of restructuring. *Glasnost* exposed both Soviet citizens and the West to increased amounts of information and culture in order to foster reform.

Today the Commission will focus on *perestroika*. That is the actual restructuring of Soviet life in the marketplace, the workforce, and within the political system. It is impossible to deny that the Soviets are taking *perestroika* seriously. And we, of course, should do as well. As outsiders it is hard to fathom the implications for Soviet domestic life, but we need to face this important task as we move closer to tackling greater problems of U.S.-Soviet relations and global stability.

That is the purpose of our hearing today. We have, as I said earlier, two very distinguished witnesses. Before I introduce them, let me again introduce Senator D'Amato the ranking Republican member and the former chairman of our Commission, who has made such a contribution to the work of this Commission. Senator D'Amato.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO FROM NEW YORK

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. Let me congratulate you and Senator DeConcini for the Commission's work this year and for this hearing today.

I do have certain time constraints, Mr. Chairman, and I'm anxious to hear as much from the witnesses as time will permit, so I'm going to ask that I be permitted to submit my statement for the record as if read in its entirety.

I look forward to hearing from two gentlemen who certainly can give us a clearer perception of whether or not Mr. Gorbachev's programs are really working, and what our responses should or should not be. Because there are, Mr. Chairman, those who say, are we going to help Mr. Gorbachev? The answer when we ask how they want us to help is usually tied to liberalizing trade, the repeal of Jackson-Vanik, opening up the international banks to the Soviets

and I think we had better look at this rather carefully before moving down this road.

So, again, Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for calling this hearing.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much Senator. And now I would like to introduce, for whatever opening statement he would like to make, Senator Harry Reid, from the State of Nevada and member of our Commission. Mr. Reid.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRY REID FROM NEVADA

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman I appreciate very much your holding this hearing. I listened to your statement. I'm anxious to read the rest of it. I think it was direct and to the point.

I, of course, want to welcome these two gentlemen to the hearing today. I appreciate them sharing their expertise with this committee. We all recognize that the subject of restructuring the Soviet economy and other institutions is of vital importance, not only to the Soviet Union, but more importantly to the rest of the world. I'm anxious to hear what is really going on. That's why I'm here and that's why you are here.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you Senator. As I said at the outset, we have two very distinguished witnesses. Senator Lautenberg has asked me to apologize to both of the witnesses for his inability to be here as he is chairing another hearing. Although he cannot be here with us, he does intend to submit a statement and I know will be reviewing the statements that both of you have prepared.

Let me now briefly introduce our two witnesses. Mr. Peter Reddaway joins us today, as he has in the past, as Secretary of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He was a senior lecturer in political science at the London School of Economics and has published numerous works on today's topic. He visited the Soviet Union as recently as last month and will address changes in the Soviet human rights situation.

Mr. Vladimir Kozlovsky was, as I understand it, the first Soviet journalist to emigrate and to gain entry back into the Soviet Union, last November. He is an editor of the only Russian language daily outside the Soviet Union and comes before the Commission with a long and distinguished journalistic and academic background.

Before emigrating to this country in 1974, Mr. Kozlovsky helped Jewish and other political activists communicate with the foreign media. Today, he will address the effects of the new reform on the daily lives of Soviet citizens.

On behalf of the Commission I want to welcome both of you and thank you for appearing before us and giving us your expertise. At this time I would like to recognize Mr. Reddaway.

STATEMENT OF MR. PETER REDDAWAY, DIRECTOR OF THE KENNAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN STUDIES

Mr. REDDAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very honored to have this chance to address your Commission again and I do so, not only as director of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian

Studies and a student of Soviet politics, but also, as you mentioned, with me having recently spent some time in Moscow.

I will start with just a very few comments about the overall trends in *perestroika* from the more political perspective, before I go over to the main aspect of my remarks, which is policies as they've been developing on human rights.

Perestroika is a somewhat vague concept involving the restructuring of almost all institutions in the Soviet Union and also in a more nebulous way, of every single person's attitudes. Individuals are supposed to restructure themselves.

Since October 1987, the radical *perestroika* program of the Gorbachev forces in Soviet politics has, in my view, suffered a setback. These forces have been compelled by the moderate reformers, who favor less radical policies, and apparently command a majority in the oligarchic party leadership, to make a partial retreat. This retreat, in my view, is not so much on fundamental principles of *perestroika* as what concerns the desirable pace of *perestroika*.

While the Gorbachev forces are currently fighting back against these moderate reformers, it may not be possible to assess the trends and the balance of forces with much precision until after the crucially important party conference which is scheduled for June of this year.

Moving on then to my remarks on the overall policy on human rights, as this has evolved in the last, almost 3 years. I think it's important to stress at the outset that this policy has been developed with careful consideration, both for the actual policies themselves—in other words, domestic policies and also, at the same time, for the foreign policy aspects (the foreign policy wrapping, if you like, of these policies).

And I'd like to speak first about this foreign policy wrapping aspect. This, to my mind, is now better defined in many ways, than the domestic policies themselves. And I would think certainly less likely to change in the coming months and years than the domestic policies themselves.

The aim of the foreign policy side is, of course, to facilitate the general conduct of Soviet foreign policy vis-a-vis in particular the West and the United States, by projecting an image that the Soviet Union is systematically liberalizing—has systematically liberalized—its policies in the area of human rights and brought those policies into line with such international documents as the Helsinki Final Act.

Now that general strategy of the foreign policy aspect of the human rights policy is not likely to change significantly in the future, whatever changes may occur as regards the domestic policies themselves. A main goal in this foreign policy side for more than a year now has been the desire of the Soviets to convene a conference on humanitarian affairs in Moscow within the framework of the CSCE process.

The West, at first, was not very convinced about the desirability of such a conference, and I think mainly for that reason, the Soviets have in recent months proliferated the number of bodies and forums into which they have tried to draw Western interlocutors to discuss issues of human rights and to try to create an atmosphere in which Western governments would eventually agree to the con-

vening of this conference in Moscow on human rights within the CSCE framework.

One of the bodies that has been formed is the so-called Public Commission for Humanitarian Questions and Human Rights under the chairmanship of Prof. Burlatsky, with whom I was fortunate enough to have a long meeting in Moscow 3 weeks ago. I understand also from you, Mr. Chairman, that there is a concerted effort to create a forum, a sort of interface between the Congress and Supreme Soviet with a very similar purpose. And there are one or two other bodies as well designed to promote the same goal.

The key political figure standing behind these initiatives appears to be Mr. Andrei Grachev, a senior official in the Propaganda Department of the Party's Central Committee. In a television interview last August, he said that the U.S.S.R. had mistakenly been trying to treat the Final Act of CSCE, the Helsinki Conference, as a document concerned only with the inviolability of European frontiers, and the Soviet Union had neglected the humanitarian aspects of the Final Act.

It had therefore been necessary, and here I quote his words,

> To discard the illusion that the West would take our word for things irrespective of our actual behavior at home and abroad, and also to discard the delusion that progress could be made on disarmament to the exclusion of problems in the field of humanitarian cooperation.

From that reassessment of Soviet policy that took place, as I say, last summer, I believe that such new bodies as the Burlatsky Commission have been created. They've emerged from that background. Burlatsky's Commission is clearly concerned primarily with the international aspects of human rights problems in the Soviet Union.

To put it crudely, perhaps, its functions are much more public relations functions, than they are with dealing with concrete abuses of human rights inside the Soviet Union. Mr. Burlatsky told me that the Commission has recently hired an assistant who will open the enormous avalanche of letters and petitions which the Commission has been receiving since its existence was announced a few months ago, and this lady simply reads the letters and petitions and passes them on to the relevant party or state bodies.

In other words, the Commission itself is not in any way an investigative body to examine such numerous letters and statements that come from citizens who feel that their human rights have been, in one way or another, abused.

An example of the sort of meetings that the Burlatsky Commission seeks to organize was one that took place, while I was in Moscow, on January 27 with a delegation from the International Helsinki Federation, and staff from your Commission took part—or people associated with Helsinki Watch—took part in that delegation.

What about the actual human rights policies themselves, the domestic policies? What is the apparent official aim behind these policies? As far as its possible to determine this, the aim of the general liberalization which has taken place over the last year has been to lighten the atmosphere in society, to remove the oppressive features of that atmosphere which became so notable in the early 1980's, to try to promote a feeling of social justice, try to promote a

feeling that all citizens can and should contribute to the implementation of *perestroika.*

When you come down to look at the actual policies, the actual practices of the officials, we find a very uneven picture against the general picture of a liberalization, a lot of confusion, a lot of uncertainty as to where things are going, a lot of unevenness. And I'll try to illustrate that by looking at the whole picture under five or six headings.

The first one is what I call "Freedom of Expression." Here, as regards the official media, there has been dramatic change in the last year to year and one-half under the so-called policy of *glasnost,* and it is now possible for a much more vigorous debate to take place in the media on various approved topics.

It's important to note that whole areas of official policy, for example, foreign policy, security policy, Kremlin politics, are excluded from this much freer debate. In other words, there's no question of removal of censorship, it is a question of freer debate on a wide variety of approved topics.

As regards unofficial media, the so-called *samizdat* publications which have existed on a large scale for the last 20 years or so, these are extremely numerous now, and there has been a vigorous debate which has only taken place partly in public as to whether unofficial groups should have access to some sort of printing facilities of their own, whether printing presses, or Xerox machines, and so on. I learned in the course of my visit to Moscow that the official legislation which is being prepared in the area of press facilities is moving in the direction of a decision, which I think may well have been taken, that unofficial groups should not be permitted to have their own printing facilities or their own Xerox machines, but they should rather be given access to state printing presses. They should be simply clients of state printing presses.

These presses, in theory it appears, in the legislation are not going to exercise censorship over the contents of materials which unofficial groups will ask them to print, but, of course, there was a lot of skepticism as to whether that lack of censorship would turn out to be a reality.

As regards individuals circulating their materials unofficially, this at the moment is going on with virtually no official harassment. On the other hand, when it comes to regular publications, regular *samizdat* publications in type-script, here there is harassment from time to time. I gained clear insight into the workings of one of the most interesting of these publications, the so-called Express Chronicle, a publication edited by Alexander Podrabinek and four colleagues.

It comes out once a week, has done since last August, is some 20 or so pages, and carries detailed material on human rights issues from all around the Soviet Union. They have correspondents in 40 cities who mail and telephones in their information from these far flung places. And that publication is able to function fairly efficiently.

The sort of harassment that it is subjected to, from time to time, is the tailing or occasional detention of editors, including Podrabinek, and the confiscation of issues of the journal which are

mailed sometimes to these 40 cities and disappear mysteriously in the mail.

The second heading I have is "Freedom of Association."

Here, as the Soviet press has told us, and as is clear from many sources of evidence, several thousands of unofficial groups have emerged in the Soviet Union over the last year or two in response to the freer atmosphere, and these groups are concerned with a very wide variety of issues. They're concerned with cultural, political, conservation, religious issues, human rights, emigration, nationalism, literature, hard rock music, feminism, film making, workers' rights, and so on.

The authorities have made efforts to co-opt some of these groups by bringing them into the orbit, say, of a club or of the Young Communist League, but so far the legislation which is apparently planned to regulate them in some way in the future has, although publicly talked about, not appeared. The main problem these groups face from local officials who, in many cases, disapprove of them, are finding suitable premises in which to have an office or hold meetings, and, as I've just discussed, obtaining printing and circulation facilities.

The third heading I have is "Freedom of Demonstration." Here, in the first half of 1987, there was an increasingly frequent trend for groups, the type I've just mentioned, to demonstrate on the streets, and they did so with a relative degree of freedom.

However, starting with the summer of last year, and in the wake of the big demonstrations by the Crimean Tatars in Moscow and by nationalists in the Baltic Republics, the authorities have cracked down to some extent, in particular by introducing local legislation barring the conducting of demonstrations in certain parts of particular cities which are attractive for demonstrators.

And beyond that, they have threatened the organizers of demonstrations with imprisonment, they've put them under house arrest on the appointed day, they've attacked them in the media, they've tailed them or detained them either before or during a demonstration, and they have often dispersed particular demonstrations with police squads. However, the picture here is uneven. Some demonstrations are not interfered with in this way, and among those are most notably—this is a frequent subject of conversation in Moscow—the demonstrations by the organization Pamyat, which is a proto-fascist Russian nationalist organization.

These demonstrations and their meetings also are not interfered with, they have a lot of freedom, and the development of this organization has given rise to an increasing level of emigrational attitudes among, particularly, Soviet Jews, since the organization is openly anti-Semitic.

My next heading is "Freedom of Movement." Here there has been considerable progress over the last year under a number of headings, such as uniting divided families, allowing short visits to the United States, for example, by Soviet citizens to visit relatives, allowing those relatives to go back to the Soviet Union on short visits to visit their families there, allowing long term refuseniks among the Jewish and Armenian communities to leave the Soviet Union after many years of refusal.

But there is one big problem area which I think is going to loom larger in the coming months. That is as regards new applicants for emigration.

A considerable proportion of these new applicants are being refused permission to leave, with the law of January 1987 being cited, which requires that applicants should have first-degree relatives inviting them to join them from abroad. If that law continues to be applied in a systematic way, then it is clear that there is going to be an increasing number of citizens who are refused emigration. And as I've indicated, the rise of Pamyat is going to contribute further to the rise of those numbers among the Jewish community.

My next heading is "Freedom of Religion." Here, so far, there has been nothing really dramatic under Mr. Gorbachev's leadership. On the other hand, there have been a number of indications of a liberalization of policy on a small scale. For example, a number of churches have been able to reopen in response to pressure from groups of religious believers, officials have been publicly criticized for preventing those churches from opening in the past on inadequate grounds, the Russian Orthodox Church has been given considerable leeway in organizing celebrations for the coming millennium of the conversion of the Eastern Slavs, and new legislation has been announced as being in the works to regulate church-state relations, apparently in certain new ways.

One of the probable new ways is as regards to charitable activities of churches, and when I was in Moscow I learned of an extremely new and potentially very significant development. The Minister of Health of the Russian Republic, Dr. Potapov, had called in representatives of the main denominations in Moscow and told them that the time had come for the churches' charitable instincts, charitable aspirations, to be allowed to function, and for the church to involve itself in this way in social affairs.

And he proposed—and the churches apparently agreed—that each denomination should be asked to take care of basic services in one Moscow hospital, one Moscow hospital per denomination, to provide basic services which are rather inadequate or simply don't exist at the present time.

If that goes ahead, as it appears to be going ahead, then it would be hard to prevent the churches from starting to operate in a much wider range of charitable activities, and it would be a remarkable change from the situation that has obtained for almost 60 years now under which churches are not allowed any sort of charitable activities, even vis-a-vis their own communities, let alone vis-a-vis society more widely.

However, this generally somewhat promising trend in the religious field must be offset by stressing that Soviet authorities have made clear they are not going to accede to the numerous demands for the recognition of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which has been functioning underground for over 40 years, nor is legalization of the Jehovah's Witnesses or the Hare Krishnas apparently on the agenda. They will apparently remain effectively banned.

My next heading is "What has Been Happening as Regards Release of Dissidents and Arrests of Dissidents." Over the last year and a bit, some 250 dissidents whose cases were known in the West

have been released ahead of time from labor camps and mental hospitals, leaving only something like a similar number of dissidents, whose cases we know of, still held.

In that period, just the last year or so, there have been virtually no new cases of arrests and sentencing of dissidents. The number of such cases can be counted on the fingers of about two hands. So there has been a definite change in policy, although there is still a long way to go as regards releases.

In the field, finally, of the Political Abuse of Psychiatry, to which I've devoted a lot of attention over the years, there is a particularly fierce battle going on here between the forces of reform and the forces of the status quo. The forces of the status quo are represented by Dr. Morozov, the president of the Soviet Psychiatric Association, and also Professor Marat Vartanyan, who has recently been appointed the director of the All-Union Center for Mental Health, in a move which has been very disappointing to the reformers.

It was hoped that he would not be appointed to that position and might be appointed to some much lower and less important position. It was confirmed to me while I was in Moscow that Dr. Vartanyan is a very close associate of the U.S.S.R. Health Minister, Dr. Chazov, and this is probably the key factor in his finally being appointed to this important position. A big setback for the reformers.

Another depressing feature of the situation in this area is the continued refusal of the Soviet authorities to admit that political abuse of psychiatry either is occurring at present or has occurred ever in the past in the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is precisely Morozov and Vartanyan, the people whose reputations have been hopelessly compromised, who are pressing hard for the Soviet Union to be readmitted to the World Psychiatric Association at this time.

On the other side of the ledger, there has been new legislation in the last month or so which will make it easier for relatives to try to extract their husbands or wives from mental hospitals in which they have been put for non-medical reasons. Also there's been a vigorous press campaign denouncing a lot of the abuses in the field of Soviet psychiatry, although so far, as I said, not admitting that any political abuse has occurred.

So, to sum up, the situation is somewhat uneven, it is confused, it is uncertain where things are going to go in the future, and my conclusion would be that where things do go in the future will probably depend, in large measure, on the general future fortunes of *perestroika* and of Mr. Gorbachev and his group, more personally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much. Now Mr. Kozlovsky will give his statement first and then we'll ask some questions.

STATEMENT OF MR. VLADIMIR KOZLOVSKY, THE FIRST SOVIET JOURNALIST TO EMIGRATE AND TO GAIN ENTRY BACK INTO THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a great pleasure and honor for me to be asked to address the Commission on the subject of the effects of *perestroika* and *glasnost* on the lives of ordinary Soviets.

Last November I spent 2 weeks in Moscow as a reporter for the Russian Daily of New York and the BBC Russian Service after an absence of 13½ years. It was highly unusual for an emigre writer to be let back into the Soviet Union.

That had not happened for decades, and certainly it was more unusual for the Soviets to let in an emigre writer who had published literally hundreds or thousands of pieces on the Soviet Union, many of which were not complimentary. I asked to go back to Russia in August last year and it took the Soviet Embassy 3½ months to issue me a visa. When I got it, it was a tourist visa though I asked for a working one.

Nevertheless, I went and was initially refused by the Soviet Foreign Ministry flatly, being told that as a tourist I have no right to engage in any journalist activity in the Soviet Union. However, after a couple of hours there was a sudden *perestroika* in the Foreign Ministry concerning my being there. I guess they called some higher ups, whoever gave me my visa, and they allowed me to be a journalist.

They let me attend their press conferences and press briefings. I was even allowed to go to our BBC office in Moscow and file stories in Russian to London about the situation in the Soviet Union, which reports were on the same day beamed back into the Soviet Union, which was probably the most unusual aspect of the treatment I got in the U.S.S.R.

I was perfectly free to roam around the city, talk to anybody I wanted to. I interviewed about 100 people, from cab drivers and army officers to the deputy editor of the Moscow News, which is their foremost liberal weekly. I talked to members of the Pamyat society, which Dr. Reddaway referred to and characterized as a proto-fascist grouping, which appeared on the Soviet scene about 2 years ago, I talked to activist Jews, I talked to refuseniks.

I did not detect any surveillance, although having been a dissident when I lived in the Soviet Union, I had some experience in watching for it. I did not detect anybody following me, and according to dissidents, they did not detect any physical surveillance in the past 1½ or 2 years.

They do assume their rooms are bugged, they do assume their telephones are bugged, and from all available indications, they are correct in that assumption. However, the physical surveillance is not visible. People do feel much freer to express themselves and this is the most striking effect of *perestroika* and *glasnost* that I managed to find in the Soviet Union.

The country struck me as drab and basically developing and quite second-rate, but what struck me the most is the reduction in the level of fear in that society. People speak much more openly, people are much less afraid to express themselves even to strangers.

If a cab driver or a driver of an official-looking car tells you that by sacking Boris Eltsin, Mr. Gorbachev spat in his own face, 2 minutes after he met you, it's something that's never happened before.

People are less afraid to speak their mind, which is a very welcome development, and though it does seem to me that at this point in the game it's still eminently reversible, it will probably

take more years for people to develop habits of free speech. It's only been 2 years so far.

Dr. Reddaway already addressed the issue of the proliferation of unofficial discussion clubs, all sorts of groupings from Left Wing Socialist to peoples of European-type Eurocommunist convictions to the Right Wing ultranationalistic Pamyat society.

And there are nationalistic groups all over the country. There are Moslems walking around Moscow listening to Khomeini's tapes on their tape recorders, and one of the theories I heard there was; should there ever be any violent turmoil in the Soviet Union, that is where it will start. Because the centrifugal—the nationalistic tendencies in that country are developing very fast.

Given the recent openness, there is more chance for them to recruit new members, and since the Soviet Union is not used structurally or historically to cushioning such extremist manifestations, the Government may have to clamp down. That country does not know how to tolerate dissent without resorting to violence, without resorting to high degrees of intolerant behavior.

So that's where real turmoil may come from, according to one of the theories. The bad news is that so far the main beneficiaries of *glasnost* and *perestroika* are the talking classes. People who write books, people who read books. It's hardly reflected on the society at large. Most people do not write books and many do not read them. So many ordinary Russians I met there were quite puzzled as to why they have this *glasnost* business.

> We did quite fine in the illusion that we had no prostitution, we were quite sure our medical services were the best in the world, we were quite sure we didn't have any drug abuse, only the West had it, and now you're telling us all that, and what do we need that for?

So there's a tremendous opposition to *glasnost* on that level of society.

Economically, the situation has deteriorated as compared to as I remember it in the early 1970's when I lived there. When I lived in Moscow there was meat in the stores, now there is none, which is true also of many other things, from bath towels to macaroni or toothpaste, which is used by drug addicts now. They find some kind of intoxicating substance in Soviet toothpaste.

And basically the supplies are much less plentiful than they were in Moscow 13½ years ago, and my observations refer only to Moscow, to downtown Moscow, which has much better supplies than the rest of the city, to say nothing of the rest of the country.

As the deputy editor of the Moscow News, Mr. Buzychkin, told me, "we have some *perestroika* in Moscow, but everybody who comes to the city from the provinces tells me there is no *perestroika* there whatsoever." So whatever I'm saying refers only to Moscow which is not representative of the country at large, which may be just as well. The country's is so heavily centralized, it doesn't matter what people think in Rostov and Vladivostok.

Gorbachev does not need the Siberian vote. All the decisions are being taken in Moscow where the elites live. So my observations have some relevance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much for your statement, Mr. Kozlovsky.

Let me, Mr. Reddaway, ask you—Did you have the opportunity to meet with Mr. Grigoryants, the editor of *Glasnost,* and also Mr. Timofeyev, who heads up, as you know, the *Glasnost* Press Club?

Mr. REDDAWAY. I had brief visits with Mr. Timofeyev and very brief with Mr. Grigoryants. I met particularly, among the people who are organizing periodical *samizdat* publications, with Alexander Podrabinow, who as I mentioned is the chief editor of Express Chronicle, and also with a group of longstanding dissidents who are organizing a new journal of their own, Larissa Bogoraz, Sergei Kovalyov, and a few others in that particular circle, and I know a lot about their plans from that.

Chairman HOYER. When I was in Moscow in January, I had the opportunity of meeting with Mr. Timofeyev and Mr. Grigoryants. They were together at the beginning but they have some differences more I think of style and procedure as to how they want to proceed. But, in any event, they face some commons problems. You obviously met with the Express Chronicle people. Let me ask you—Did you find that they had the same problems with respect to the printing or duplication of publications?

Obviously that is a significant source of concern for anybody that wants to put out any publications. You speak, of course, in your statement with respect to copying machines or typewriters, which of course are licensed and essentially illegal to be owned privately.

Mr. REDDAWAY. Yes. This is the biggest practical concern that I think just about all these groups have, is how to duplicate their publications, and they're trying various methods. They're trying straightforward typewriting, they're trying computer distribution, computer disks, but they invariably have problems.

Very few citizens have access to personal computers, circulating disks is not terribly efficient because people don't have printers. So this is the biggest problem that they have, and it's why I focus particularly on this question of access to printing facilities.

Chairman. HOYER. Let me ask you about your meeting with Mr. Burlatsky. I saw Mr. Burlatsky very briefly in December when he was here with the General Secretary for the summit. When I say very briefly, it was not more than 20 minutes at his hotel just before he was leaving. He had just recently been appointed.

Did you have a discussion with him regarding the revision of the Criminal Code, with respect to the questions of emigration and communications, printing facilities and transmittal of information, as it relates to the Helsinki Final Act, which you stated earlier he has stated as being a principle purpose of the Commission that he has been appointed to head?

Mr. REDDAWAY. I didn't have detailed discussions with him on those points. He told me that he was planning that the Commission should have a series of three, as I understood, public hearings. And one of these hearings would be to do with informal organizations and their legal status. Another would be to do with religious freedom. And I forget now what the third hearing was to be concerned with.

Apparently, the idea was to assemble the Commission to allow individuals to put their questions or complaints to those groups—to that group—to have the proceedings perhaps broadcast in extracts

on television, and I got the impression that this was very much a public relations—would be a public relations exercise.

Although perhaps to some extent it would also serve to educate the members of the Commission about the concerns of ordinary citizens, since most of the people who are on the Commission are highly placed individuals, some of them in politics, some of them in literature, the arts, who are by-and-large protected from any day-to-day contact with ordinary people.

So he didn't give me a clear idea of where legislation was likely to go. I did, however, pick up bits and pieces about where legislation was likely to go from some of my other meetings. And on the question of the Criminal Code, I had a long meeting in the Institute of State and Law with its director who clearly has played an extremely important role in the drafting of the new Criminal Code, which is going to be a completely new document rewritten in its entirety.

And he gave me the understanding that there was already a completed draft, and that it would probably be printed fairly soon, probably in advance of the party conference in June. He gave me some idea as to what would be some of the features of that draft. He said article 190–1 would probably be eliminated, that's on activities which defame the Soviet social and political system. He indicated that article 70 would be revised if not removed. It would be made more precise. That's article 70 on Agitation and Propaganda.

He indicated that the number of crimes which attract the death penalty will be greatly reduced, but the death penalty will not be completely eliminated.

And from something Mr. Burlatsky said, it's clear that there is going to be, in the field of legislation on religion, church-state relations, there are going to be some changes, and in particular it would appear this legislation may cover the changes I was referring to about charitable activities on the part of the churches.

On emigration, I had some interesting conversations, including one or two with very official people. The line there, however, is not very encouraging. The impression I was given was that the Soviets have solved the problem of emigration, that they are not going to change their legislation, that they're going to apply the law as it stands, which is going back on indications we had a few months ago that maybe they would apply the law in a flexible way, and I certainly reached the conclusion that this is potentially a very serious area of confrontation between the Soviet Government and those Western governments that are raising concern on this issue.

Of course, it may be that the Soviets are keeping this as a bargaining chip which they will play at the appropriate moment in some future negotiations, that they will in fact say they will apply the law in a flexible way. But for the moment, that is not the impression I got from talking to a number of semi-official people.

Chairman HOYER. Let me followup on that question before I end and recognize Mr. Feighan. Did Mr. Burlatsky talk about any interface that he had with the Commission that supposedly exists in the Supreme Soviet to review individual cases?

Mr. REDDAWAY. He did not, but it was clear that his Commission is working and has a sort of interface type body in the—its existence has attracted this enormous avalanche of complaints and peti-

tions from all the citizens and groups, and they've got it as their job to pass these materials on to relevant bodies such as the one mentioned.

Chairman HOYER. Did you get information from anybody else on the Supreme Soviet Commission? Very frankly, my own experience has been, in talking to a number of people in the Soviet Union who have tried to appeal to the Supreme Soviet, is that they never have an interface with any group and never have an ability to meet with, see or be assured that in fact such a group does exist.

Mr. REDDAWAY. No, I did not get any information on that. In the many conversations I had in which that might come out, it did not. It suggests to me that that is not, as it were, one of the active areas of development. The active areas of development appear to be much more groups like Mr. Burlatsky's Commission.

There is also, I might mention, a Human Rights Commission of the Soviet Peace Committee, which had a meeting while I was in Moscow at which the same sort of topics that I described Mr. Burlatsky's Commission as organizing hearings on were discussed in that Human Rights Commission as well, the Human Rights Commission of the Soviet Peace Committee.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you. Mr. Kozlovsky, I'm going to recognize Mr. Feighan, but I've got some questions for you, too, so I'll get back to you.

Congressman Ed Feighan of Ohio, a member of the Commission and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee as well.

Representative FEIGHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kozlovsky, I'm curious about your impressions of public opinion in Moscow. As I understand from your remarks, you hold the view that public opinion on these reforms in Moscow is of some consequence, but that public opinion may be of less consequence the further one gets from Moscow. Is that a fair characterization?

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. Yes, it is, Congressman.

Representative FEIGHAN. I want to understand your final conclusion. Is your conclusion that there is limited public support for the reforms, but that the reforms are generally seen as irrelevant to the more consequential concerns of the average Soviet citizen, which are essentially economic concerns?

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. Whatever impressions I was able to form are entirely unscientific in the absence of any serious public opinion surveys. What I encountered there is a huge amount of public pessimism, a lot of cynicism, on the part of intellectuals; total indifference on the part of the ordinary people, or expectations of the worst. Because they're afraid that under *perestroika,* they will be urged to work hard, and they already are, but they haven't seen any improvement in return.

So what most ordinary people I talked to expect from the economic side of *perestroika* is just more hard work and less of anything. No more-pay, or maybe even less-pay. That public opinion influences the Politburo in Moscow seems to be quite clear. The Politburo does not—or whoever runs the country—does not live in a vacuum. They have friends and relatives, they have families who meet with other people who are part of the intellectual establishment in Moscow.

There is a trickling down of ideas from the top and a trickling up of opinions to the top from the bottom. Whatever influence the intellectual classes have on the Government exists only in Moscow, because in the provinces the public opinion doesn't matter much.

Representative FEIGHAN. That would seem to reflect the attitudes of individuals in terms of domestic issues. But there have been considerable foreign policy events—the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the arms agreements with the United States, new ties with Israel, and other events—that would seem rather consequential. Did the individuals you spoke with perceive these events to be part of *perestroika*?

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. Out of 10 hours of discussion in Moscow, 9½ hours would be domestic issues, and maybe 30 minutes on issues of foreign policy. Arms control has never been discussed in my presence either when I lived there or when I visited in November. This is just totally beyond the scope of any discussion you would have with intellectuals, to say nothing of ordinary people.

There's very little talk of Israel, except in the Jewish circles, which hope that there will be an improvement in the Soviet-Israeli relations. Some hope that if there are diplomatic relations with Israel, then maybe Soviet Jews will be able to travel to the Holy places and come back.

So that will sort of reduce the importance of the emigration issue because people just won't emigrate if they have a chance to visit Israel.

The impression there is that the Soviet Union has no army or missile force. It's so far beyond the scope of anybody's immediate experience that it's just not subject to ordinary discussion. In 2 weeks I only heard SDI mentioned once, for example.

Representative FEIGHAN. Thank you, Mr. Reddaway, I'd like to pursue an interest that I know that you have, namely, psychiatric care in the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, my colleague, John Miller, and I are sending a letter to the Soviet Ministry of Health signed by over 100 Members of Congress on behalf of seven Lithuanian dissidents who have been subjected to considerable psychiatric abuse for various political reasons, such as signing petitions, declining Soviet citizenship, and other actions of that nature.

They are incarcerated in psychiatric hospitals in spite of what is presented to be reform of that system, or at least, certainly a change in rhetoric. I understand from your testimony though that there is still considerable resistance by Soviet officials to acknowledging even that a problem ever existed or exists today.

So, I want to ask you what reasonable expectations we should have about the possibility for fundamental changes in psychiatric abuse that has existed in the Soviet Union? I would be most interested in knowing whether personnel changes affecting psychiatric care in the Soviet Union have been made?

You mentioned in your testimony that unfortunately, there was a depressing, and significant change with the elevation of Dr. Vartanyan. Was that change typical? Are there other changes in personnel that might indicate that there will be some real significant change?

Mr. REDDAWAY. I spoke with three psychiatrists during my visit, and with several other people who have a strong interest in this whole subject, and I have studied it myself for about 18 years. I think I have a fairly clear picture, but the picture is one of enormous conflict and uncertainty as to the outcome.

On the sort of negative side, the forces of the status quo are very strong, and in the last month or two it has appeared that they have at least been holding their own, and they made an important advance with the elevation of Vartanyan to the important post of director of the All-Union Center of Mental Health. That position had been vacant for about 5 months, and it was very much hoped by the reformers that a figure untainted by involvement in political abuse of psychiatry would be appointed to that position.

Because of—it was explained to me that it was in the wake of the Eltsin affair that what I call the center-right forces within Soviet politics, the more status quo, the more conservative elements, took their chance in the field of psychiatry, as in a whole range of other fields, to make a certain resurgence to beat back the forces of reform, at any rate to limit the extent of reform. And it was in that way that Vartanyan was appointed. Apparently it was directly related to that.

His patron is—clearly his most influential and powerful patron—is Dr. Chazov, the U.S.S.R. Minister of Health, who has been for many years a close associate of Dr. Vartanyan because he involved him in the group known as International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a group whose positions are very favorable to Soviet policies, in general.

And Vartanyan played a close role with Chazov in that they wrote a paper jointly, and Chazov has a powerful position not only as Minister of Health, but as a member of the Central Committee, and as somebody who for many years was involved with the personal health of Soviet leaders, as their sort of number one personal physician.

So the forces of the status quo have a rather strong political base. I was told that the forces of reform have a key supporter in the Central Committee apparatus, Baltrunas. He has apparently been able, in conjunction with Mr. Yakovlev, a member of the Politburo, Alexander Yakovlev, to get into the Soviet press a very interesting succession of articles over the last year which have gradually opened up Soviet psychiatry to some sort of scrutiny by more critically minded journalists and a few psychiatrists and some jurists and lawyers. And Soviet psychiatry has been criticized to a degree which had not taken place since the 1920's. And some really terrible things are coming out of the cupboard.

However, the politicians have clearly drawn a line which for the moment the reformers are unable to break down, and that line is—there is not and has never been any political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. Morozov and Vartanyan have been giving a succession of interviews in the last few months saying just that, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at a meeting said it to a press conference a few months ago, and meanwhile reformers in their materials in the Soviet press get closer and closer to trying to hint that there have been serious political abuses.

They have depicted cases where people who have complained about injustice or corruption at their work places have been locked up in psychiatric hospitals for doing that, which is getting very close to getting onto public record the fact that dissidents are being locked up in psychiatric hospitals for criticizing the regime. But they haven't quite got there.

So the best informed of the psychiatrists I spoke to, he was very well informed, told me that the situation is one of enormous conflict and the outcome is uncertain.

I might add that there was hope for some time that the Health Minister of the Russian Republic, Dr. Potapov, whom I referred to in my statement, who is a psychiatrist, might be one of the more dynamic elements in favor of reform. I understood in Moscow that this is unfortunately not the case, that he is a friend of Vartanyan and now that Vartanyan has been elevated further, it seems as though Dr. Potapov will not be a particularly assiduous voice on the side of reform as we had hoped he might be previously.

The editor of the main Soviet psychiatric journal is a new man recently appointed, Dr. Badalyan, who is regarded as a fresh figure. However, he's a neuropathologist and the key psychiatrist on the board is Dr. Zharikov, who is a very close associate of Dr. Morozov, the man I mentioned before as the director of the Psychiatric Institute and the president of the Soviet Society of Psychiatrists.

Representative FEIGHAN. Thank you very much.

Chairman HOYER. The procedural reforms, which I understand are an effort to try to give—or at least an expressed effort to try to give some rights to those determined to be, or alleged to be, in need of psychiatric care.

Did you get into the procedural reform, and if so, did you make an analysis or have you made any kind of analysis with respect to the substance of the procedural protections?

Mr. REDDAWAY. Yes, I have, and I did refer to it briefly in my statement, but let me elaborate on it. We still do not know exactly what all the legal provisions are going to be, but we have a fairly clear idea from the materials that have been published in the Soviet press.

The biggest single innovation is that Soviet citizens will, in the future, have some right of appeal to a court regarding compulsory hospitalizations which they believe not to have any medical foundation.

In the past, many citizens including dissidents have been forcibly hospitalized and they can be kept there indefinitely if psychiatrists claim that they are mentally ill. And that's been no recourse to the court.

Now, under this new legislation, there will be recourse to the court on the part of relatives after the individual has been hospitalized. There is no recourse to the court prior to hospitalization, which is a defect, in my view, of the law, but still there is recourse by relatives after compulsory hospitalization, and it apparently will enable relatives to bring psychiatrists into court as expert witnesses, in the way that occurs in democratic societies, who will argue that the individual isn't mentally ill, and that will presumably compel the other side to bring in the psychiatrists who have

claimed that the individual is mentally ill, and the court will have to determine who to believe.

This legislation has apparently already had a salutary effect on psychiatrists in the Soviet Union who are now worried that they must take much greater care, they must be more cautious before they simply do what the police, or secret police, suggest to them they should do because they're dissidents. And in the view of the dissidents I spoke to, this is a definitely hopeful development.

Part of the whole process is also the removal from the so-called psychiatric register in the Soviet Union of enormous numbers of citizens who have been kept on it despite the fact that they have long since recovered from their mental illnesses or were never ill in the first place, but have been nonetheless kept on the state psychiatric register for years and years.

And there was a press conference a few days ago in Moscow at which it was announced that something like 2 million people were expected to be removed from that register. That will be a good development and will contribute to the reformist trends that are operating within Soviet psychiatry battling against these very, very strong forces of the status quo.

Representative FEIGHAN. If I may, I'd like to ask Mr. Reddaway specifically what the consequences are of being on that register? I saw that report and was stunned that there are some 2 million names that apparently will be removed from the register. How many names remain on it and what are the consequences of being listed?

Mr. REDDAWAY. We don't, unfortunately, know how many will remain on—assuming those 2 million really are removed. The process has only just started and it was confirmed to me by a psychiatrist in Moscow that it has started, but it only started in the beginning of January. We don't know how many will be left on after the process is completed, but my guess is that probably still a million or two. It's a very large, extremely large register.

The consequence of being on that register is that any psychiatrist at the place—at the particular clinic or hospital where you are registered—has the right to summon you for examination whenever that psychiatrist wishes. There's a typical way in which that would happen, it would be if the police or an employer were to telephone into the psychiatric clinic or hospital and say I think you ought to examine so and so, he appears to be mentally ill.

Or in a case of abuse, I think you ought to summons him, he's causing us problems again for one reason or another, maybe not medical reasons. And the person is then summoned. They're supposed to be summoned regularly every month or two anyway, and they're examined, and of course the result of the examination is that the person is then forcibly hospitalized.

That is the basic consequence of being on the register. Being on the register is linked to, but also somewhat separate from, the categorization of such patients into one of three categories. If you are in the most acute category, then you're not allowed to be employed and you're not allowed to drive a car, and a whole lot of limitations are put on your civil rights. Go down through the second category to the first category, and in the first category your civil rights are hardly limited at all.

Representative FEIGHAN. Thank you very much.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Kozlovsky, in your statement you referred—and I'm switching subjects now from the human rights aspect of *perestioika* to its economic aspects to the fact that in the seventies when you were there, there was a greater supply of agricultural goods, meats, vegetables, and a much more restricted supply today.

In your discussion here today you indicated that you talked to about 100 people. What was their explanation for that, if any? What was the feeling among the Soviet public with whom you talked as to why the situation exists now and why it has deteriorated over the years?

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. To many it was the result of a natural process of that society's collapse, which prospect many of them broached. Among the foes of Gorbachev's reform, I met quite a few intellectuals who said that they would rather Brezhnev stayed in power for 10 more years, then the whole damn place would fall apart on its own, and they'd welcome such a prospect. And they could never answer what would've happened when the society fell apart. What good it would do for them or for anybody else.

Before, their rationale was that we're spending too much money to help other countries, our foreign aid is bleeding us. That rationale I didn't hear this time. Nobody complained, at least in my presence, of the Afghanistan war costing too much.

It's just the impression of a general malaise, a general sickness of society which has very nonspecific forms. Fourteen years ago everybody had some specific explanation, now it's just a general picture of bleakness that I encountered.

Chairman HOYER. Was there any sense that the Gorbachev era has made this worse in any way?

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. For some people, certainly. I was there before January 1 when the second stage of his reforms was implemented, when 60 percent of all industrial enterprises became self-sustaining, self-financing.

But before some of them were made, such as on an experimental basis, and everybody who knew of them said they just made the mess even worse. They'd just as well have it the way it was before, because now the system was becoming much more complex, much more messy, so that certainly wasn't seen as an improvement by those who saw those first experimental stages of the reform.

Chairman HOYER. Let me go, Mr. Kozlovsky, to another subject. On Februai 4, your newspaper reprinted the Eltsin speech of October 21. This version contained attacks on Ligachev and on Mrs. Gorbachev. We understand that there are, however, several versions of the Eltsin speech.

Do you have any insight into which version may be correct?

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. What I heard in Moscow, because I was there when the Eltsin story broke out and depressed everybody considerably, Gorbachev in the first 2 years managed to regain some faith. He managed to get people to trust the Government somewhat, and he lost all that, just squandered all that on the Eltsin affair.

In any case, what I heard in Moscow, there are no copies of the speech because somebody who knew somebody who was present at the meeting where Gorbachev severely criticized the speech, said

that the speech was burned. There are no copies whatsoever. So whatever was being published was a translation of a translation of some *samizdat* copy, to whose authenticity I just can't attest.

Mr. REDDAWAY. I have a comment on that. I read a couple of copies of the speech in Moscow in the middle of January, and the view of myself and of some of the Soviets who read it, and also of journalists who saw it a few days later, Western journalists in Moscow, was that the versions that we saw were probably not fully authentic.

The main reason for thinking that, is that there does appear to be good evidence that Eltsin did not attack Mrs. Gorbachev. And all the versions, I believe, that have circulated, certainly the ones I saw, contained three or four lines of a rather strong attack on Mrs. Gorbachev, from which everybody deduced, and I certainly deduced, that this was a falsified text, maybe that most of the text was authentic but with this section, at least this one section added, and that circulating the text was one of the dirty tricks performed by the anti-Gorbachev elements in the Soviet Union.

There is a history of such dirty tricks by his opponents, and this would appear to fit very well into that history. The reason why this is clearly, to my mind, an anti-Gorbachev move, is that Mrs. Gorbachev is not popular among, most particularly, the nomenklatura, but also among the people more widely, and she is accused in this text of interfering on a daily basis in the most crude way with the way Eltsin was trying to run Moscow. And she has no authority to interfere in that way.

And so to accuse her of that is clearly to accuse Gorbachev, by extension, of sanctioning this sort of activity or even directing this sort of activity on the part of his wife, and it becomes a very severe criticism of Gorbachev.

Chairman HOYER. Which would tie in, I suppose, with the editing of the Brokaw-Gorbachev interview, where the sole deletion was of Gorbachev's response with respect to discussing everything with Mrs. Gorbachev.

Mr. REDDAWAY. Well, deleting that was—could have been an action on the part of elements who were concerned to protect Gorbachev's reputation and to limit the damage to his reputation within the nomenklatura, because if it had been published that he discussed all political matters with his wife, that would have produced very adverse reaction.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Kozlovsky, let me ask you about the national aspirations of nationality groups within the Soviet Union. Among the people with whom you talked, who I presume were overwhelmingly Russian—is that correct?

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. Yes.

Chairman HOYER. Did this subject come up, and if so, what was their feeling with reference to self-determination among the various nationality groups?

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. That question I discussed mostly with intellectuals who support self-determination or anybody. As for ordinary people at large—I was in Russia when they invaded Czechoslovakia, and from what I heard it was universally applauded by the public at large.

Chairman HOYER. The invasion?

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. Yes, absolutely. "We showed them." In that sense, I'm sure that a withdrawal from Afghanistan, should it ever occur, would not be a popular gesture for millions of people who are not accustomed to losing their wars. Whatever face the Government puts on getting out of Afghanistan won't play well in Saratoy.

Chairman HOYER. Let me ask you one last question, and then if you want to ask one more question as well—I unfortunately have another meeting at 11:30. I proposed a question to five young Soviets, four interpreters and one who was a coordinator for the CYO—as to their view with respect to allowing Soviet citizens to emigrate.

All five—they were between the ages of 23 and 32—all five, without hesitation and emphatically indicated they thought that anybody who wanted to leave the Soviet Union ought to be permitted to leave, and one of the women added "and good riddance." This, in my view, displayed a typically American attitude with respect to people who want to leave the United States.

That is, if you want to leave the United States, go and good riddance because we can't understand why anybody would want to leave the United States. That was five for five. I mentioned that in the task force meeting in which we were participating after that.

Is it your impression that that reflects the general attitude of the Soviet citizenry as opposed to the Government? I'm not talking about the Government, which I understand has a policy against emigration.

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. The only way to judge that is from letters from ordinary Soviets published in Russian newspapers in the past 18 months, concerning those emigres who came back to the Soviet Union from America, and there was a vehement reaction against those people saying, "if you left, you're a traitor, it's bad enough you left, it's even worse that you're coming back." Emigres are not a popular social group in the Soviet Union.

Chairman HOYER. That's not, Mr. Kozlovsky the question I'm asking. I understand that. As a matter of fact, I believe that reflects good riddance. And I think that's the general American attitude as well, frankly.

Mr. KOZLOVSKY. I'm not sure it's a general Soviet or Russian attitude. Throughout centuries people who emigrated, people who left their motherland were not popular, and were frowned upon. It changed for the better in the 19th century. Then the Soviets came, and I'm not sure that would be the prevalent attitude in society.

Your sample was not very representative because those interpreters by virtue of knowing a foreign language are a very small percentage of the population open to Western ideas.

Chairman HOYER. Well, there's a poll that's been taken, however, that reflects that 70 percent of the Russian public—I frankly don't know the validity of the poll—but it indicated 70 percent of the respondents in effect said if somebody wants to leave, they ought to be allowed to leave.

Again, the issue is not whether they're popular or not. You're focusing on the attitude towards the individual, which I also think maybe negative. I agree with that. But do you have a comment on the general attitude as to the right of citizens to leave?

Mr. REDDAWAY. Yes, I would tend maybe to differ a little bit from Mr. Kozlovsky. I think that the group you spoke to were all young, and I think there are big distinctions between the generations and their attitudes on these matters. It doesn't surprise me what you were told.

I would hazard a guess that indeed among young people in the Soviet Union, people in their midtwenties or younger, that many of them would have the sort of attitude that you describe about emigration.

One of the reasons I have for saying that is that there was a poll, a rather scientific poll, carried out on the attitudes of different generations to private and cooperative economic activity, individual private sector activity, as opposed to state-run activity, and the distinctions between generations were absolutely astounding.

People in the young generation were in favor, with only a tiny proportion of them against, people in the mid-generation, forties, fifties, sixties, were very strongly against, they were in favor of the status quo, and only then a tiny number of very elderly who remembered the 1920's, even pre-revolution times, favored more private and cooperative activity.

So I think these enormous differences between generations are very significant, and I think they would probably apply to what you described. I might just say, again, I diverge a little bit from Mr. Kozlovsky on Afghanistan. I don't think Afghanistan is Czechoslovakia. I found different attitudes on Afghanistan with a general disposition to favor withdrawal.

People said, what business do we have in Afghanistan? They're not Slavs, they're not, as it were, part of the Slavic family of nations, this helps to explain the attitude on Czechoslovakia.

These are people who are very different from us. We weren't invited to go there. I found a strong mood in favor of pulling out.

There were certain exceptions to that. I'm not saying that it's 100 percent. There is the group of people who went there through military service, who fought hard, who were not demoralized by drugs as many of the other Soviet soldiers are, who had their patriotic emotions fired up in Afghanistan, and who pose certain social and political problems to the Soviet authorities now, and if the withdrawal takes place, that problem may become more severe.

Chairman HOYER. Let me go back to this question on the Soviet sentiment with regards to emigration. In the older generation, or the middle generation, would the reason for their opposition to emigration be with respect to the duty of the citizen to the state to stay and make the motherland better, or would it be not so much on duty but the necessity for the state to prohibit anybody leaving because of the need of the state? That's sort of the same question posited from two perspectives.

Mr. REDDAWAY. It is more the former than the latter, but I think probably in the case of the people aged, say, forties and above—certainly fifties and above—they don't think about it terribly analytically. They've simply been conditioned into a general style of thinking which is hostile to that sort of notion. And one needs to be a psychologist to understand it all.

Some theories have it that they simply envy anybody—secretly envy—somebody who's able to emigrate, but that they're against

other people doing it because they can't do it themselves. And I think there may be something in that theory.

Chairman HOYER. I would like to pursue that question because—and regrettably we don't have time—because I believe that one of the thrusts that we're going to need to make is on the general question of emigration. We've been focusing largely on individuals because of our frustration in dealing with the general question.

But we need to really focus on this general question and on the preclusion, that is, the requirement for first-degree relatives.

Your statement reflects a retreat by the Soviets substantially. For example, Ambassador Kashlev in Vienna told Ambassador Zimmermann, not to worry about the language but watch what is being done. Of course, that now holds very little water because of the fact that what is being done is a reference to that prescription, in fact applications are not being accepted unless there is certification of first-degree relatives existing overseas.

I'm sorry that we can't pursue that further, but I would like to pursue that on behalf of the Commission in the future. Any additional questions?

Representative FEIGHAN. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. I want to thank both of you for being with us. I apologize that we are not able to spend a greater amount of time, but look forward to using—if I could use that term—both of you as very significant, knowledgeable resources for the work of the Commission in the future. Thank you both.

[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the meeting was concluded.]

APPENDIX 1

SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO

OPENING STATEMENT

HELSINKI COMMISSION HEARING

ON

PERESTROIKA IN THE SOVIET UNION

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I WANT TO BEGIN TODAY BY EXPRESSING MY APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFORTS YOU AND OUR DISTINGUISHED CO-CHAIRMAN, SENATOR DECONCINI, HAVE EXERTED TO ASSEMBLE THE OUTSTANDING PANEL OF WITNESSES APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMISSION TODAY. THEY ARE UNIQUELY WELL-QUALIFIED TO TELL US ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S REFORM EFFORTS. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM THEM THIS MORNING.

IT IS POPULAR TO ASK WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD "HELP" GORBACHEV WITH HIS REFORM EFFORTS. THIS QUESTION REVEALS A DEEP MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND OF OUR ABILITY TO AFFECT INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION.

WHEN WE ASK WHAT PEOPLE MEAN BY "HELPING" MR. GORBACHEV, THE ANSWER IS USUALLY THAT WE SHOULD LIBERALIZE TRADE ARRANGEMENTS AND PRESS AHEAD FASTER WITH EFFORTS TO REDUCE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THIS COMES DOWN TO WAIVING OR REPEALING THE JACKSON-VANIK AND STEVENSON AMENDMENTS, ADMITTING THE SOVIET UNION TO THE WORLD BANK AND GATT, AND REACHING RAPID AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION.

THESE ARE VERY MAJOR STEPS WHICH AFFECT THE ECONOMIC HEALTH AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ENTIRE WESTERN WORLD. WE WOULD BE FOOLISH TO TAKE THESE STEPS MERELY IN ORDER TO "HELP" GORBACHEV'S REFORM DRIVE. THESE STEPS SHOULD ONLY BE TAKEN WHEN WE JUDGE THEM TO BE IN OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST.

REPEAL OR WAIVER OF JACKSON-VANIK OR STEVENSON SHOULD REMAIN BASED UPON SOVIET RELAXATION OF EMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS. WHILE I AM PLEASED THAT SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION INCREASED TO A TOTAL OF 8,155 PERSONS IN 1987, UP FROM 914 PERSONS IN 1986, IT STILL FALLS VERY FAR SHORT OF THE TOTAL OF 51,320 PERSONS WHO WERE PERMITTED TO LEAVE IN 1979.

MOREOVER, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT RECENT REPORTS INDICATING THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE TIGHTENING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR EMIGRATION RULES. LAST MONTH, ONLY 722 JEWS WERE PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE U.S.S.R. IF THIS MONTHLY RATE WERE TO CONTINUE FOR THE ENTIRE YEAR, ONLY 509 MORE PEOPLE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE IN 1988 THAN WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE IN 1987.

DOES THIS SOVIET PERFORMANCE JUSTIFY REPEALING OR WAIVING JACKSON-VANIK AND STEVENSON? CLEARLY, IT DOES NOT.

WE SHOULD NOT MAKE EVEN MORE GENEROUS ECONOMIC GESTURES INTENDED TO HELP THE SOVIET ECONOMY UNTIL SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE IMPROVES. SO FAR, THEY HAVE RELEASED 250 PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE. REPORTEDLY, APPROXIMATELY 450 PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IDENTIFIED BY NAME IN THE WEST REMAIN CONFINED. THIS MEANS THAT, DESPITE THE HEADLINES WON BY RELEASE OF PROMINENT SOVIET DISSIDENTS, NOT EVEN HALF OF THOSE IMPRISONED FOR POLITICAL REASONS HAVE BEEN RELEASED.

WORSE, THE KGB APPEARS TO HAVE TOUGHENED ITS APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS AND DISSIDENTS. YESTERDAY, IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS USED THREATS AND MASSIVE POLICE PRESENCE TO PREVENT PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS IN LITHUANIA COMMEMORATING THAT STATE'S BRIEF PERIOD OF INDEPENDENCE.

DESPITE PUBLICATION OF REVISED RULES FOR PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS -- WHICH RECEIVED PROMINENT COVERAGE IN THE WESTERN MEDIA -- PEOPLE ARE STILL BEING COMMITTED TO THE "SPECIAL" PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS. JUST AFTER THE NEW RULES WERE REPORTED IN THE WEST, NEWS CAME THAT ANOTHER DISSIDENT WHO HAD SPENT 17 YEARS IN CONFINEMENT HAD JUST BEEN COMMITTED TO A SPECIAL PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

VERY LITTLE NEEDS TO BE SAID ABOUT THE DANGERS OF RUSHING INTO ARMS AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS. THE INF TREATY TOOK YEARS TO NEGOTIATE. IT HAS REDUCED TENSIONS AND

IT WILL BE RATIFIED LATER THIS YEAR. I THINK, ON BALANCE, THAT IT IS A GOOD TREATY AND I SUPPORT IT.

WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, RUSH INTO A START AGREEMENT. WE HAVE TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT ANY STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENT WE REACH IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST, IS VERIFIABLE, AND IS ENFORCEABLE. WE MUST NOT PLAY GAMES WITH OUR NATIONAL SECURITY BECAUSE WE WANT TO DO GORBACHEV A FAVOR.

WHILE WE CANNOT HAVE A GREAT EFFECT ON SOVIET DOMESTIC POLICIES, WE REMAIN VERY INTERESTED IN THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS. THE NEXT FEW YEARS HOLD THE POSSIBILITY OF DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT HAPPENS THERE CAN HAVE A VERY GREAT IMPACT ON OUR OWN FUTURE.

ACCORDINGLY, I LOOK FORWARD TO LEARNING THE VIEWS OF OUR DISTINGUISHED PANEL OF WITNESSES ON MR. GORBACHEV'S REFORMS.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG FEBRUARY 18, 1988
BEFORE THE HELSINKI COMMISSION ON PERESTROIKA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing to investigate the meaning of perestroika.

Many of the reforms instituted under the rubric of perestroika have not yet been in place long enough for us to understand their meaning. For instance, in January of this year, the most sweeping move toward restructuring the economy was put into place. Roughly 60 % of the Soviet industrial and agricultural production was switched to a system under which it is economically accountable.

These enterprises are now expected to finance themselves, and to some degree locate their own sources of supply and their own customers. This is a radical departure from previous practice, and it remains to be seen how it will work in practice. It's no surprise that in an economy plagued by shortages of many industrial materials, this freedom is not something that everyone will welcome.

In fact, many ordinary citizens dislike some of Gorbachev's economic changes. They point to the widespread unavailability of vodka, and the fact that more cash for better work means little in a culture where there is little to buy with the extra money. And the thought or threat of unemployment has causes much distress among a population that is used to the law guaranteeing everyone a job.

Gorbachev also lacks the universal support of his party in undertaking his reforms. Ultimately, his success in implementing a widespread reform program in the Soviet Union depends upon how effectively Gorbachev can consolidate his power through the bureacracy.

That is why I welcome the views of our assembled experts here today who can give us their insights as to how Gorbachev is doing on implementing perestroika, and what signs they see of his ultimate success or failure.

QUESTIONS FOR WITNESSES

1. Where does the main opposition to Gorbachev's reform programs lie? How great is governmental opposition to Gorbachev's programs in your view, and how great a threat does it pose to his ultimate success?

2. How much of a boost to Gorbachev's internal reforms will the ratification of the INF Treaty be? Gorbachev and Reagan both seem anxious for quick progress on a START treaty. Do you believe this will help Gorbachev consolidate his power and authority and thus create an additional boost to his reform efforts ?

3. The Soviets recently announced they were prepared to do away with the emigration law requiring an applicant to have an immediate relative living aborad. How serious do you think they are about this promise, and what do you think prompted this announcement?

4. How do you assess the Soviets recent claims to be reforming the abuses that have plagued the Soviet psychiatric system ?